This is a book about the utility of nuclear power in the post-Cold War era. But it is also about the transformation of war, global power, and interdependence. It is written with an eye toward providing different perspectives on the political, military, and economic dimensions of war, and it provides a range of useful insights and analysis of the role of nuclear weapons in the next century. The authors emphasize that states are on the brink of something new in international politics, that indeed the post-Cold War era is ushering in a "systemic shift in the distribution of power," that the role of the atom bomb as an instrument of regional and global politics is changing. The point of departure is Bernard Brodie's famed 1946 essay, "The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order." Brodie argued eloquently that nuclear antagonists can ensure their predominance through deterrence only after successfully developing a second strike (or retaliatory) capability. Furthermore, Brodie did not envision the emergence of an arms control regime and, indeed, argued that such a regime would not succeed because states tend to distrust their adversaries' intentions.
The authors of The Absolute Weapon Revisited set out to "parallel" or build on the original essay by reflecting rather than proving or disproving a specific set of hypotheses in the original thesis. In so doing, old assumptions about the credibility and guarantee of these weapons are examined and reassessed. Most of the contributors conclude that nuclear weapons are here to stay, but nuclear deterrence is likely to be moderated by the so-called revolution in military affairsthe emergence of new advances in conventional weapons technology and in military organizations and doctrines. Total force is what powerful states are likely to seek in the next century, not just nuclear weapons. As one author states, "fostering a post-nuclear ethic requires neither abandoning deterrence nor making the world safe for conventional war: Bosnia suggests that superpower nuclear weapons will have little bearing on post-Cold War regional/ethnic disputes.... The benefits for U.S. security of maintaining a robust, global nuclear triad will be surpassed by the advantages of the revolution of military affairs in a denuclearization world" (pp.
264-5).
The volume is organized around three main clusters of 764 issues: the revolutionary nature of nuclear weapons, deterrence, and international control of nuclear arsenals. The ten contributions are written with an eye toward providing contentious analysis and policy recommendations on the questions of deterrence, compellence, and arms control and disarmament. The book also provides rigorous new analysis on how to evaluate the strategic value of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era, as well as the risks (in terms of costs and benefits) associated with their acquisition. The strength of The Absolute Weapon Revisited lies in highlighting the decline in importance of nuclear weapons in the strategic environment and the rise of interdependence as a means of providing regional and global economic and security guarantees. This may lead either to the rise of nuclear defense coalitions in the form of new collective security arrangements or to nuclear-free zones. Some nuclear newcomers, however, such as India and Pakistan, will continue to shape their strategic prerogatives around their security rather than their power needs. The book also highlights prospects for successful arms control. The authors conclude that international cooperation is the key, but the traditional nuclear powers (the original club) must continue to set a good example to be followed. Perseverance will pay off in the form of perhaps an eventual "denuclearized" global environment. The future remains uncertain on this front, however. Weak states will probably continue to view acquisition of nuclear and other nonconventional chemical and biological weapons as necessary to reduce the cost of maintaining large standing armed forces. Ironically, chemical and biological weapons cannot equal nuclear weapons strategically. They do not make for a good deterrence. They are harder to control and pose major logistical problems for those who seek to deploy them. Such weapons are ineffective against nonstate actors or in urban environments with a large population.
In short, collective security and collective defense will have a better chance of deterring wars in areas where there is a low security threat. The reverse is true if the stakes are higher, as in the Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia, and East and Central Europe. In some but not all of these states, rationality may prevail. There will be cases, however, in which prudence could easily give way to ambitious leadership, miscalculations, or accidents. In such scenarios, both antagonists are likely to be effected adversely by the other side's action or reaction.
The weakness of the book lies primarily in the fact that it is not written for the average reader, and it will be difficult for undergraduates. It is ideal, however, for specialists in the field of nuclear proliferation, international politics, and for graduate students. The book is highly theoretical and heady. It could have been enhanced by a chapter on the economic implications of nuclearization in the next century. It stands on it own merit, however, as a major contribution to the ongoing debate on whether the acquisition of nonconventional weapons is more or less conducive to the outbreak of war. This volume answers these questions and suggests that the EU is increasingly emerging as an important actor in the realm of international politics. As the excellent chapter by Sophie Meunier persuasively argues, other international actors, including the United States, must take into consideration the policies and politics of the EU during negotiations. As the chapter by Olufemi Babarinde expertly points out, the EU formulates coherent and cohesive policies of investment, aid, and development vis-a-vis the less-developed countries. Even in the realm of foreign and security policy, the EU has begun to develop a framework for articulating a common set of concerns, policies, and programs.
As noted in the title of the chapter by Fraser Cameron, however, the one common theme to this collection is that the EU is "far from pushing its political weight around." It is still far from attaining the attributes of a nation-state, is often held hostage by the intergovernmental concerns of its members, and has failed notably (in the former Yugoslavia) to devise a common foreign and security policy. Moreover, despite the good intentions of European politicians, the EU's decision-making structure "continues to impede the cohesive development and maintenance of external policies, whenever member state economic or security interests are seriously affected" (p. 232). Needless to say, it is these instances of high politics that demonstrate the general impotence of the EU as an actor in the international arena. As such, this volume is a sobering reminder of just how far the EU has to go to develop a common voice in international politics.
This edited collection, with contributions from a diverse and skilled set of leading U.S. and European authors, is the culmination of presentations at a European Community Studies Association workshop held in May 1996. Three additional chapters were solicited from other scholars with expertise in the area of the EU to fill out the volume. This collection should be seen as part of a growing literature on the EU in the world community (e.g., Christorpher Piening, Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs, 1997).
The book starts with an overview of the EU's activities in the international arena as well as a discussion of the challenges facing the EU as it develops an international voice. Subsequent chapters are largely focused on substantive issue areas: three chapters on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), one chapter each on Russia, Central-Eastern Europe, relations with the global South, the U.S.-EU partnership, European monetary union, agriculture and the Uruguay Round, and global environmental policy. The broad array of issues and the depth of analysis within each area are the collection's strength. Anyone with an interest in the EU should find something of value in the volume. Each chapter is carefully written, is nicely structured and organized, and presents the issues under review in a clear and concise manner. There are no errors of fact that I could find, and the chapters move crisply forward. Taken as a whole, this is an excellent book.
There are two primary weaknesses. First, there is no unifying theoretical or analytical framework in the volume for evaluating the EU as an international actor. This is perhaps understandable, given that this is a relatively new area of research. But the lack of a unifying framework makes the conclusions of each chapter narrow in application. Allen and Smith (chap. 3) use the concept of "presence" to explore the development of European security policy. Meunier (chap. 10) employs a modified two-level game to examine the interplay between the EC's institutional structure and international negotiations. Schirm (chap. 4) suggests the application of a framework using the concepts of "necessity, viability, and adequacy" (p. 66) to understand the policy performance and policy prospects of a CFSP. Jupille and Caporaso (chap. 11) posit four components of actor capacity-recognition, authority, autonomy, and cohesion-for understanding the EU's role in global politics. These excellent chapters can stand strongly on their own, but the theoretical and analytical conclusions about the EU as an "actor" that one can draw from the entire volume are necessarily limited.
Second, some of the chapters could be further refined and are somewhat limited in scope. Hosli's contribution on monetary union does not adequately focus on the crucial arena of the euro's exchange rate politics-the central component of the EU's future monetary presence in global politics. Mayhew's historical chapter could have systematically employed a matrix using his own concluding remarks on the importance of national interest as determined by history, geography, economic policy convictions, and financial interests in defining the EU's policies toward Central Europe. Sbragia's contribution on the transatlantic partnership, pushed by business and investment ties, is informative, but it lacks an overarching argument other than there may be an emerging "symmetry" (p. 162) in transatlantic relations. While symmetry in terms of foreign investment may exist, it does not exist in the real world of power. This area is left largely unexplored.
These points should not detract from this important contribution. The EU as an actor in global politics is a difficult topic, and this admirable first effort at characterizing a rather slippery entity should be commended. The book is highly recommended for all scholars, diplomats, and international relations scholars engaged in understanding the EU. The premise of the volume is that the cognitive approach to understanding foreign policy decision making (FPDM) has focused on choice, or option selection, to its detriment. The weightier matter, the volume argues, is not choice, but problem representation. As Sylvan puts it: "How did the
